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ABSTRACT 
 
Global investments have grew tremendously in the recent years. As a result, mergers and 
acquisitions are becoming a daily occurrences.  To achieve their goals, multinational 
corporations have to go through the process of filing for permissions with the various 
antitrust authorities in various countries with different rules and regulations.   This paper 
deals with the antitrust laws and rules and regulations in the three major regions in which 
most mergers occurs.  The regions and countries under consideration are the United States 
of America, Japan and the European Union.    
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
irect Investment has grown tremendously in the past few years.  Most of the foreign direct 
investments have been between major industrial nations.  Developing nations and countries with 
very small population size received limited or no foreign direct investment at all.  The U.S. share of 
growth in  the foreign direct investments have been, on average, near 9 percent in the last three years, of which the 
increase in direct investment in Europe is 9.2 percent,  with Asia near 8.85 percent, and with the rest of the world, 
it is very minor.  As a result mergers between international corporations are now almost a daily occurrence.  Not 
only it is difficult to agree to terms of a merger between two companies, but many companies have to go through 
the process of filing for permission with the various antitrust authorities in the countries where they do business.  
Three of the most influential and powerful antitrust authorities are: 
 
 The United States Department of Justice and Fair Trade Commission 
 The European  Union Competition Commission 
 The Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
 
  When these three bodies communicate effectively, the mergers turn out well; however, proposed mergers 
often get rejected because of the vast differences of opinions and definitions between the US, EU and Japan.  In 
order to alleviate these difficulties, greater harmonization between the laws in these three regions is vital.  To 
illustrate this, an attempt has been made at first to present anti-trust laws within each area, then describe and 
compare the functions of the agencies involved, and finally to present case studies on certain mergers, as examples 
for dealing with anti-trust regulations. 
 
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
United States has some of the strongest laws concerning competition of any industrialized country. The 
first antitrust laws dated back to the 1890's.  It all began when "trusts" (or holding companies) were created to bring 
together all the firms in a particular industry, such as The Sugar Trust, The Tobacco Trust, The Steel Trust. 
These trusts were very large enterprises that dominated their industry and in some cases production worldwide.  
The largest trust was the Standard Oil Company, which was established in 1867 and owned by John D. 
D 
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Rockefeller.  The opposition to the trusts came mostly from farmers who protested against the high cost of rail 
transport to take their products to the cities, led to the passage of the first anti  trust law: The Sherman Act of 1890. 
 
Some of the practices banned by the antitrust law were: 
 
 Monopolies 
 Predatory pricing at below cost to drive out competitors 
 Legal business practices including restrictions on opening hours, resale price, maintenance, and tie -in sales 
 
Although this law was passed in the late 1800's, the Standard Oil,  Company was not brought to court and 
broken up until 1910.  In 1914, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was set up, and in 1934, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was created. Throughout the next few decades, the trend of breaking up trusts set tled 
down and a new trend of merging companies together arose. The belief that big was beautiful in the corporate 
sector was given another boost by America's experience in World War II, when it was the big companies like Ford, 
GM and GE that were seen to have helped win the war by their extraordinary increase in wartime production.  
Finally, by 1960, a change in political climate brought a new wave of breaking up trusts.  The new targets of 
breaking up trusts were now AT&T and IBM.  The two cases had very different outcomes. The government's slow-
moving case against IBM never made much headway before it was dismissed in 1982.  However, two years after 
the IBM case collapsed, the U.S. government succeeded in breaking up the AT&T telephone monopoly.  Today 
Microsoft is a large company that many claim to be monopolistic in nature.  It is a company that since 1998 has 
been under investigation and continues to be under close watch from the United States government into the new 
millennium. 
 
Today, the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing laws that promote competition in the 
marketplace.  Competition benefits consumers by keeping prices low and the quality of goods and services high 
according to the FTC.  Several other laws have been passed regarding the issue of fair competition.  One of these is 
the Robinson-Patman Act (1934), which is based on one fundamental principle: "to assure, to the extent reasonably 
practicable, that businessmen at the same functional level would stand on equal competitive footing so far as price 
is concerned," according to the FTC (2002).  However, the Robinson-Patman Act was actually an amendment to 
the Clayton Act (1914). The Clayton Act regulates general practices that potentially may be detrimental to fair 
competition. Some of these general practices regulated by the Clayton Act are:  price discrimination; exclusive 
dealing contracts, tying agreements, or requirement contracts; mergers and acquisitions; and interlocking 
directorates.  The Clayton Act was passed as an extension to the Sherman Act.  
 
Although tough antitrust laws have been passed in the United States for more than a hundred years, they 
have only been enforced sporadically throughout the century. The seemingly successful US antitrust model has 
been widely duplicated in other countries, such as Japan, Mexico, and Poland. 
 
COMPETITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
In order for international markets as well as the individual markets of the European Union to run 
smoothly, policies on competition must be enacted and strictly enforced.  These policies seek to level the playing 
field for all countries that trade with one another within the union.  According to the European Union online 
(2002), "Competition policy seeks to encourage economic efficiency by creating a climate favorable to innovation 
and technological progress."  These policies protect not only countries and governments, but also the consumers 
themselves.  Consumers can safely buy imported goods with the knowledge that they are getting a fair deal.  These 
policies simply keep competition healthy so that one large firm cannot dominate the entire market for a specific 
good or service thus setting price and quality standards. 
 
The European Union adapted their laws of competition from those set forth in the Treaty of Rome (1957).   
Article 81 (previously article 85 in the European Community Treaty) covers agreements and concerted actions that 
interrupt competition between the EU member states.  A restrictive agreement is an agreement where two or more 
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companies force one or more of the companies to accept a certain way of conducting business. A concerted practice 
is a restrictive agreement without formal contracts, just an understanding of agreement.  Article 81 does not allow 
any practices that in any way try to restrict competition among the EU countries. According to Article 81, the 
following agreements are strictly prohibited under EU competition policy: 
 
 Horizontal or vertical agreements that fix prices directly or indirectly  
 Agreements on conditions of sale, investments, production or delivery quotas  
 Joint sale offices 
 Market sharing agreements  
 Collective boycotting  
 Agreements that isolate market segments 
 
Not all agreements are outlawed by Article 81.  Those seen as beneficial and that improve the manufacture 
of goods or help to progress technology may be allowed.  Exclusivity and franchise agreements are among these 
agreements that are exempt from the rules. 
 
Article 82 of the European Union's Treaty of States protects the nations against one company or a few 
companies from having a "dominant position.”  This position gives the company the ability to control market 
situations through a decrease in competition.  It is an effective monopoly.  The EU sees this as adversely affecting 
trade throughout its member nations.  The company has the ability to set prices or trade restrictions as well as 
restrict supply to artificially increased prices.  Simply, monopoly and oligopoly with price leadership position is 
banned. 
 
Several regulations have been added to the EU Treaty in order to allow representatives to examine and 
make final decisions on potential mergers and acquisitions.  Regulation 4064 reserves the right to veto merger 
requests between companies that could possibly create a dominant position and therefore impede "effective 
competition".  The representatives examine the merging companies' product and the scope of its market.  In 
addition, they look at how large the geographic market for the product will be.  Finally, inspectors judge if the 
newly formed company is in harmony with the internal market.  If everything is in order then the merger will be 
able to move on to completion. 
 
Article 87 forbids member states from granting financial assistance to firms in their country that will 
hinder the competitive process for any firm inside or outside that country.  In other words, a country cannot favor 
the industries within their country over those in any other country within the EU. This helps to keep trade in 
balance.  This article covers not only government aid, but aid coming from private citizens and corporations as 
well.  Few types of contributions have been exempted from this rule.  Any contribution gained by contributing 
positively to society or for cultural conservation is allowed as long as it is not restricted to a certain product group.  
In addition, money donated to aid a company in rebuilding following a natural catastrophe is also permitted. 
 
COMPETITION IN JAPAN 
 
After World War II, competition laws were successively enacted in numerous free economies.  In Japan, the 
Antimonopoly Act was established in 1947, and the Fair Trade Commission was established for its enforcement.  
Japan's first competition law gave rise to a full-fledged market economy and established economic democracy.  In this 
respect, its achievements are of crucial importance. It was modeled after the United States antitrust law and the 
Antimonopoly Law established a free and fair competitive market.  This policy was quite different from the traditional 
Japanese way of thinking; therefore, after the Depression of 1952, the Antimonopoly Law was relaxed in 1953.  
Throughout the decades, the competition laws of Japan, were highly debated and relaxed many times, until the decade 
of 1970s and the Miki cabinet came into office.  After the oil crisis of 1973, the monopolistic market of Japan was 
criticized to the point that the Miki administration was forced to proposed a bill, which was recommended by the FTC 
to strengthen Japanese competition laws.  After much debate, the bill was passed in 1977.  This was the first time that 
the Japanese Antitrust Law was strengthened. 
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Since the late 1970's, large demands have been made by foreign countries for a more competitive and open 
Japanese market  In response to these demands, the Japanese government began to actively pursue competition policy 
in conjunction with "deregulation," which has made tremendous strides. The Antimonopoly Act has now entered a 
turning point in meeting these demands.  In this connection, the structure and role of the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission, which is in charge of the implementation of the Antimonopoly Act, are being improved. 
 
Today, the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act aims to remove obstacles to free and fair competition in the 
market and ensuring the sound operation of the market mechanism.   Its purpose is to: 
 
 Assure the interest of consumers 
 Promote free and fair competition, stimulating creative initiatives of firms, enlivening business activities  
and increasing the level of employment and people's real income by: 
 
o Prohibition of Cartels 
o Prohibition of Private monopolization (restrictions on mergers and  acquisitions)  
o Prohibition of unfair trade practices 
 
The Antimonopoly Act has been enacted not only to appease consumers, but also to help firms engage in 
free business activities in a free economy by eliminating unreasonable restraint on business activities and 
monopolization of a market. 
 
Since the 1990's several changes have been made again, to strengthen Japanese competition laws.  Some 
of these changes include: 
 
 Reducing exemptions related to cartels 
 Relaxation of restrictions on holding companies 
 Abolition of the notification system for international contracts 
 Reduction of exemptions for resale price maintenance 
 Revision of the notification system for mergers 
 Relaxation of restrictions on premium goods 
 The enlargement of the FTC staff 
 
All of these proposals have been made with the collaboration of the United States and most of them have 
been implemented since 1995.  Today, Japanese competition law is, again, very similar to that of the United States, 
as it was in the late 1940's. 
 
ANTI-TRUST AGENCIES 
 
United States 
 
For over six decades, the mission of the U.S. Antitrust Division has been to promote and protect the 
competitive process and the American economy through the enforcement of the antitrust laws.  The antitrust laws 
apply to virtually all industries and to every level of business, including manufacturing, transportation, distribution, 
and marketing. They prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade, such as price-fixing conspiracies, corporate 
mergers likely to reduce the competitive vigor of particular markets, and predatory acts designed to achieve or 
maintain monopoly power. 
 
The Division prosecutes serious and willful violations of the antitrust laws by filing criminal suits that can 
lead to large fines and jail sentences.  Where criminal prosecution is not appropriate, the Division institutes a civil 
action seeking a court order forbidding future violations of the law and requiring steps to remedy the anti -
competitive effects of past violations. Many of the Division's accomplishments on these fronts were made possible 
by an unprecedented level of cooperation and coordination with foreign antitrust enforcement agencies, and the 
States Attorney General Offices.  The Division is also committed to ensuring that its essential efforts to preserve 
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competition for the benefit of businesses and consumers do not impose unnecessary costs on American businesses 
and consumers. 
 
The Division has provided more guidance to the business community in a shorter time than ever before, 
much of it jointly with the Federal Trade Commission.  This guidance is in the form of newly revised and expanded 
joint statements of policy regarding the health care industry, licensing of intellectual property, guidelines on 
international operations, and an accelerated individual review process.  The revisions lower the costs to business 
complying with the law by reducing uncertainty about the parameters of legal behavior.  The guidance of the 
Division saves money for both business and the government by helping companies to structure and organize their 
operations in accordance with the law, thus avoiding the need for expensive litigation. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) antitrust arm, the Bureau of Competition, seeks to prevent 
business practices that restrain competition.  As a result, purchasers benefit from lower prices and greater 
availability of products and services.  The Bureau carries out this mission by investigating alleged law violations 
and, when appropriate, recommending that the Commission take formal enforcement action. If the Commission 
does decide to take action, the Bureau will help to implement that decision through litigation in federal court or 
before administrative law judges. 
 
The Bureau also serves as a research and policy resource on competition issues.  It prepares reports and 
testimony for Congress, and may present comments on specific competition issues pending before other agencies.  
The Bureau of Competition has developed expertise in a number of industries important to consumers, such as 
health care, food, energy, and other professional services 
 
Both the FTC's Bureau of Competition and the Antitrust Division of the Department of justice enforce the 
antitrust laws.  In order to prevent duplication of effort, the two agencies consult before opening any case. The 
Commission’s antitrust authority comes primarily from the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Act, 
both passed by Congress in 1914. 
 
European Union 
 
The European Competition Commission is an anti-trust agency that operates at the very heart of the 
European Union.  Its role as the source of policy initiatives is unique; yet this role is not always clearly understood.  
The Commission has used its right of initiative to transform the framework established by the initial treaties into 
today's Competition Commission.  The benefits for citizens and companies throughout the Union have been 
considerable and include: 
 
 Freedom of movement 
 Greater prosperity 
 Less red tape 
 
 But the Commission has not done this alone.  It works in those in partnership with the other European 
institutions and with the governments of the Member States.  Although the Commission makes the proposals, all 
the major decisions on important legislation are taken by the ministers of the Member States in the Council of the 
European Union, in co-decision or, in some cases, consultation, with the democratically elected European 
parliament. 
 
The Commission consults widely with interested parties from all sectors and all walks of life when 
preparing draft legislation.  In addition to its power of proposal, the Commission acts as the EU executive body and 
guardian of the Treaties.  It represents the common interest and embodies, to a large degree, the personality of the 
Union.  The Commission's main concern is to defend the interests of Europe's citizens.  The 20 members of the 
Commission are drawn from the 15 EU countries, but they each swear an oath of independence, distancing 
themselves from partisan influence from their home country. 
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The Commission's job is to ensure that the European Union can attain its goal of an ever-closer union of 
its members.  One of the principal tasks here is to secure the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons 
throughout the territory of the Union.  The Commission must also ensure that the benefits of integration are 
balanced between countries and regions, between business and consumers and between different categories of 
citizens. 
 
Other national anti-trust agencies in Europe include the following: 
 
 The United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading 
 The United Kingdom Competition Commission 
 The Sweden Konkurrensverket 
 The Direccion General de Policia Economica y Defensa de la Competencia 
 The Portugal Direccao-General do Comercio e da Concorrencia 
 The Netherlands Competition Authority, The Ireland Competition Authority 
 The Germany Bundedkartellamt 
 The Finland Kilpailuvirasto 
 The Swedish Competition Authority 
 The Spain Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia 
 The France Direction Generale de la Concurrence 
 The Belguim Ministere des Affaires Economiques Concurrence 
 The Autria Wettbewerbsservice (BMwA). 
 
Japan 
 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission is the central anti-trust agency in Japan, and is established as an 
administrative organ of the state to achieve the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act.  The Fair Trade Commission 
implements the Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations and the Act Against Delays in 
Payment of Subcontract Proceeds to Subcontractors, both of which are special laws complementing the 
Antimonopoly Act.  The Japan Fair Trade Commission is administratively attached to the Prime Ministe r, and is 
positioned as an extra ministerial body of the Prime Ministers Office.  
 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission acts as an administrative organization under the council system, 
consisting of a Chairman and four Commissioners.  In implementing the Antimonopoly Act, the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission independently performs its duties without being directed or supervised by anyone else.  
 
A unique feature of the Japan Fair Trade Commission is that, as an independent administrative agency, it 
has the quasi-legislative power of enacting internal regulations and the quasi-judicial power of implementing 
hearing procedures, in addition to the power as an administrative body.  It has the power to designate unfair trade 
practices and premiums and it may enact internal regulations and regulations concerning the settlement procedures, 
reporting and certification. 
 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission was empowered to implement the Antimonopoly Act and its special 
laws with the intention of removing political clout associated with the implementation of these laws. Such political 
clout arises because the Antimonopoly Act and its special laws, which prescribe basic rules of business activities in 
a free system and thereby constitute the foundation of the Japanese economic system, handle various matters, 
including conflict of interests.  
 
Another reason why the Japan Fair Trade Commission was established is that, like a court trial, the 
settlement of violations of the Antimonopoly Act calls for neutrality and fairness.  Furthermore,  since these laws 
are applied to constantly changing situations, their implementation requires the expert judgment of experienced 
persons who have a wealth of knowledge in law and economics. 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – June 2005                                          Volume 4, Number 6 
 23 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE LAWS 
 
Overall, the laws of the US, EU and Japan are similar because they all stem from the establishment of 
United States law at the beginning of the 20th century.  The main laws that these agencies have focused on are the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, both of which focus on the breakup of the conglomerate businesses in the 
beginning of the century.  The major difference between the U.S. and EU is that while the U.S. usually focuses on 
protection of the consumer, the EU protects businesses and employees.  Japan's competition laws mirror the U.S . to 
a greater degree than the EU.  The major differences include lower worldwide visibility and less clout in the 
regulation of international mergers. 
 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 
 
There are also numerous international anti-trust agencies in which Japan, the United States, and the 
European Union are all members of.  The OECD's Committee on Competition Law and Policy is the world's 
premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments on how best to harness market forces in the interests 
of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity.  Bringing together the leaders of the world's major 
competition, or antitrust, authorities, the Committee is the chief international forum for the regular exchange of 
views on important competition policy issues. 
 
The Committee is supported in its mission by the Competition Law, and Policy (CLP) Division within the 
OECD's Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. The role of the CLP Division is to provide the 
Committee with analytical support and promote its reform platform around the globe.  To this end, the Division 
prepares analytical papers, sector studies and policy recommendations, as well as offers hands-on support to 
governments seeking to strengthen their national competition frameworks.  
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is another international antitrust agency, established in 
1989 in response to the growing interdependence among Asia-Pacific economies.  APEC began as an informal 
dialogue group, but has since become the primary regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical 
economic cooperation. Its member economies include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's 
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,  
Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam.  Its goal is to advance 
Asia-Pacific economic dynamism and sense of community. 
 
The Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) coordinates APEC's work on the liberalization and 
facilitation of trade and investment.  APEC Ministers agreed that the CTI would develop an understanding of 
competition issues, in particular competition laws, and policies of economies in the region.  They agreed that the 
CTI must learn how competition laws and policies affect flows of trade and investment in the APEC region and 
identify potential areas of technical cooperation among member economies.  It works to reduce impediments to 
business activity in fifteen specific areas as outlined in the Osaka Action Agenda:  tariffs and non-tariff measures, 
services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, competition 
policy, government procurement, deregulation, rules of origin, dispute mediation, mobil ity of business people and 
implementation of WTO obligations.  CTI also provides a forum for discussion of trade policy issues.  
 
CASES 
 
Because the United States and the European Union are the largest regulatory bodies, they often make the 
final decision in Merger Cases.  In addition, the EU as a unit or block accounts for the second largest portion of 
U.S. trade (see Figure 1) .  As such, the cases will focus on the three major mergers proposals: Price Waterhouse 
and Coopers & Lybrand, American Airlines and British Airways, and GE and Honeywell. These cases bring up 
interesting differences in, the regulatory procedures of the U.S. and EU. 
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Successful Mergers 
 
Many of the important aspects in attaining clearance from regulatory authorities are present in the 1998 
EU-US Cooperation agreement. Both agreements are supposed to increase the cooperation and dialogue between 
the two authorities.  In the Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger, the companies took an active 
approach to ensure reciprocal notification and exchange of information when they signed a non-confidentiality 
agreement. This allowed the Competition Commission of the EU and the Department of Justice of the U.S. to 
exchange information freely. 
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Review for the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand, began in late 1997 and 
concluded in June 1998.  Although on the facade, it looked as though problems may emerge, both the EU and U.S. 
authorities approved the deal.  Some of the initial complications included the need to file with authorities not only 
in the U.S., EU and Japan, but also Switzerland, Canada and Australia because of the worldwide presence of both 
firms.  In addition, they were merging two of the Big 6 accounting firms at a time when KPMG and Ernst & 
Young, two other of the Big 6, were also trying to merge. The proposed merger between two worldwide enterprises 
created the largest professional service network with revenues of over $15 billion. 
 
The EU Competition Commission's initial concern was that the merger would harm competition in the 
audit markets for banking and insurance companies.  However with the failed negotiations of KPMG and Ernst & 
Young, many of their concerns were put to rest.  Another concern came as the Commission initially looked at data 
regarding competition within each country instead of data on a worldwide basis; this posed a problem because in 
certain countries, the two firms did dominate the market; however, on a worldwide basis, they did not. Ultimately, 
the EU agreed to emphasize worldwide competition.  In addition, there was a great deal of opposition from 
competitors.  More than 3/4's of European Multinational CFO's opposed the merger in addition to 71 percent of 
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their U.S. counterparts. The competitors' stance was based on concerns that the merger would allow a large 
increase in prices and in addition that it would lead to more consolidation among the "Big 6."  In the final decision, 
the U.S. and EU both concluded that the merger didn't impede competition because it didn't create a dominan t force 
in a unique market.  According to Simon Evenett (2000), they all based their decision on similar reasoning in 
concluding "the auditing needs of these sectors (banking and financial services) were not so unique as to create any 
serious risk that the merger would lead to an increase in audit fees." 
 
The main reason for success in the creation of Pricewaterhouse Coopers was the cooperation between EU 
& US.  In addition to the non-confidentiality agreement, both the EU & U.S. defined the market as audit ing and 
reporting on the financial statements of large, publicly traded companies that ultimately would not negatively affect 
competition in the industry.  Another important factor was the lack of political and competitive influence. For 
example, although two competitors, KPMG and Ernst & Young, requested a review by the U.S. Senate, the US 
Senate declined. 
 
Failed Mergers 
 
Although there have been many agreements such as the 1991 EU-U.S. Cooperation Agreement and the 
supplementing Agreement of 1998, much disagreement remains between EU and U.S. competition authorities.   
Specifically these differences are: 
 
 Differing procedures 
 Differing levels of transparency 
 Differing definitions, including how much emphasis should be put on vertical non price restraints 
 
 According to Simon Evenett (2000), American Airlines and British Air proposed semi-merger provides an 
interesting example of an alliance that was attempting to begin measures, which may eventually lead to a full 
merger in the future.  Their proposition simply included the sharing of revenue and costs in transatlantic flights.  
Initially, the parties did not even think the EU would have jurisdiction because the wording in the Treaty of Rome 
limited its authority in international air transportation.  In addition, no international air merger had ever been 
reviewed by the EU.  However, as the regulatory review process began, a myriad of problems surfaced, and as it 
turned out both the EU and the U.S. had jurisdiction. 
 
Although all the authorities agreed that the merger would impede competition if not modified in regards to 
the availability of slots at Heathrow, differences soon arose in regards to how many and in what way the airlines 
should get rid of their slots.  Slots are basically available flights into an airport.  Initially, the companies were asked 
to divest 168 of their 3,352 slots freeing 12 spots daily for competitors.  However, the EU ended up determining 
that 267 slots would have to be given up for the merger to go through whereas the U.S. determined the initial 168 
was sufficient.  Further differences arose as to how the airlines should divest their slots.  In the view of the 
European Union, slots were assets of the government; therefore parties should relinquish slots without 
compensation. They were concerned that without government regulation, all slots would end up in the hand of 
powerful airlines. This effect would be increased by the airlines getting an asset they paid nothing for adding a 
huge sum of money to their balance sheets.  On the other hand, the U.S. viewed the slots as assets of the 
marketplace; therefore parties relinquish slots with compensation. They, along with the UK, had more faith in free -
market and were not focused on how the merger would affect companies as much as customers.   In addition, the 
Competition Commission went further than the U.S. or UK authorities when they asserted that the merger 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position, in violation of article 86. 
 
The proposed alliance was further complicated by an open skies agreement, which the U.S. tried 
unsuccessfully to attain with England.  An open skier agreement is a political agreement that would allow either 
country to fly to and from any airport in each other's country.  This political issue became tied to the proposed 
alliance between American Airlines and British Airways and eventually was the reason for the Department of 
Justice not approving the deal. 
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As a result, political decisions over-taken jurisdiction decisions in this case.    In addition, if there was 
greater exchange of information, the authorities may have agreed on an acceptable number of slots to give up and 
an acceptable way in which to divest them. For instance, the airline companies could have sold the slots but 
ensured that a fair proportion go to smaller airlines to avoid any abuse of dominant position in the market.  
Furthermore, problems stemming from political and competitive influences could have been avoided had 
information been kept more confidential within the authorities.  However, these are options that are not viable due 
to a lack of coordination between the two authorities. 
 
Although these factors played a role, the key point that prevented the EU and U.S. authorities from 
reaching a consensus was differing definitions.  This is a common reason for disagreement because in general US 
antitrust law is set up to protect the consumer whereas EU antitrust law is designed to protect businesses, as shown 
in the proposed merger of GE and Honeywell.  This proposed merger, beginning in November 1999 provides a 
very controversial example of disagreement between EU and U.S. competition authorities.  Although there were 
signals for success such as the companies signing a non-confidentiality agreement and all parties communicating 
throughout the process, the EU ultimately did not approve the merger. Their differing vantage points and their 
procedural differences caused the main conflicts of opinion between EU and U.S. authorities.  The EU was worried 
that the integration of Honeywell's avionics and GE's strength in jet engines could lead to dominance of the market 
through vast control over distribution networks, leading to a vertical non-price restraint. Furthermore, they focused 
on the effect on other businesses and were very concerned about economics of scale. According to Mario Monti, 
the competition commissioner, the merger would force prices down through Strategic Behavior, or offer package 
deals of products that less diversified companies could not offer. 
 
In the U.S., the competition authorities operate with many checks and balances.  For instance, they must 
get an order from independent judicial authority to block so as to avoid one group from unilaterally blocking a 
merger. Unlike the U.S., the EU Competition Commission can unilaterally block cases as a result of acting as 
investigator, judge and prosecutor all at once. This lack of transparency has been widely criticized by both 
Americans and Europeans and ultimately was one of the major reasons the merger between GE and Honeywell 
failed. 
 
Throughout the merger process, the U.S. focused on the effect on consumers instead of other businesses. 
This is clear in the final list of objections by the EU where competitor's concerns were evident.   Furthermore, the 
U.S. took the position that package deals would lower prices thereby increasing competition and efficiency for 
customers. They believed that there is no differentiation between strategic behavior and true increased efficiency. 
Another reason the merger was ultimately approved in the US was that they gave GE and Honeywell an 
opportunity to address the concerns of competitors.  Alternatively, the final notice of objection was the first time 
GE and Honeywell saw some of their competitor's objections. 
 
Because the two competition authorities could not ultimately come to a consensus, the merger was denied 
in June 2000. Throughout the process, the media put all the differences between the EU and U.S. competition 
authorities under a magnifying glass, particularly the lack of transparency in the EU Competi tion Commission. 
This is an issue that plagues many of the EU institutions who are currently working towards an acceptable solution.  
With the implementation of such a solution, the authorities of the EU and U.S. will be able to work more closely 
because of increased communication. 
 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
International authorities are important because political issues often get tied to merger cases, as witnessed 
by the open skies proposal and the attempted merger between American Airlines and British Airways. The creation 
of an international forum will provide a non-biased forum for cooperation where parties can engage in open 
dialogue to agree on an acceptable level of transparency and on similar definitions, so as to avoid future conflict. It 
will be based on the framework laid out in the 1991 and 1998 agreements between the EU and US and expanded 
upon through organizations such as the OECD's Competition Law and Policy Committee, APEC, Japan, and other 
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major regulatory authorities.  Tying an international merger authority to an existing organization will allow a 
transfer of knowledge and ensure a greater degree of success. 
 
 This global organization (forum) must eventually have tools to ensure enforceability but will begin simply 
as a forum for discussing issues.  Developing the international merger authority slowly will alleviate the concern 
authorities and citizens of the EU and U.S. have about supranational organizations.  Furthermore, slow 
implementation follows the path that most international organizations have taken.  For instance, GATT began as a 
skeleton compared to its eventual transformation into the WTO.  It is necessary to begin this process immediately 
because of the immense conglomeration of business that is going on internationally.  Although it i s important to 
avoid business mergers that impede competition, it is critical to differentiate such relationships from those that will 
ultimately help businesses, customers and countries. The only way to do so is to create an international merger 
authority that will encourage the EU, U.S. and Japan towards the increased communication that is vital for the 
harmonization of antitrust law. 
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